



**Republic of Kenya**

**Baseline Study on the  
Performance Monitoring and  
Evaluation Culture  
in the Public Sector in  
Kenya**

**October 2019**

***(Final Report)***

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## Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
CLEAR-AA	Evaluation and Results Anglophone Africa
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plans
CIMES	County Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System
CPPMUs	Central Projects and Planning Management Units
CVF	Competing Values Framework
GOK	Government of Kenya
IMS	Information Management System
NIMES	National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCAI	Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument
SAGAs	Autonomous Government Agencies
TWENDE MBELE	Twende Mbele Programme
TOR	The Terms of Reference

## Executive Summary

This baseline survey is an initiative of the Government of Kenya through the State Department of Planning with support from the Twende Mbele Programme. The Twende Mbele Programme is a partnership between governments, the African Development Bank and the Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results-Anglophone Africa, to strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems in the public sector. The Kenyan baseline survey was carried out in August and September 2019, targeting state departments, state corporations and county governments.

The objective of the survey was to establish baseline information on the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) culture that exists within the public sector by identifying the current conditions against which future changes in the country's National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System and culture could be tracked to increase the adaptation of monitoring and evaluation and performance management as part of public sector reform. The working hypothesis of the survey was that *an M&E culture that looks positively at change, adaptation and learning leads to improved and operational performance systems*. To test this hypothesis, the survey sought to answer four questions, namely: Is there an endogenous demand for M&E in the public sector? Is there an adequate supply of M&E evidence to meet demand? What are the barriers to the use and supply of M&E evidence in the public sector? What is the dominant performance M&E culture in the Kenyan Public Sector?

A standard questionnaire was used to conduct the survey, in order to make the findings comparable to those of other countries where the survey had already been done. Using a cross-sectional survey design, a total of thirty-six (36) in-depth interviews and thirty-seven (37) online surveys were conducted, cutting across the state departments, state corporations and county governments. Quantitative data were analysed descriptively, while qualitative data were analysed using content analysis, patterning, theming and scenario mapping.

The study showed that endogenous demand for M&E within the public sector is driven by several articles in the Constitution of Kenya 2010, which imply the need for a structured way of monitoring policies, programmes and projects. Further, the County Governments Act, 2012, and the Public Finance Management Act, 2012, require clear county planning and monitoring systems. Within the public sector, the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate works to strengthen evidence-based policy formulation and improve the tracking of results. To achieve this, the Directorate works with various Central Projects and Planning Management Units (CPPMUs) at both levels of government. Almost all institutions surveyed had a unit dedicated to M&E. Most of these units were headed by officers at senior management level within the government. This is an important condition in ensuring endogenous demand, as it guarantees that it will be championed high up in the organisation structure. However, in the public sector, accountability for performance, and resource allocation decisions, are vested in the office of either the Principal or Cabinet Secretaries, a good proportion of whom were reported to be not

ensuring consistent demand for evaluation. As a result, too few resources were allocated to evaluation.

Further, erratic changes in government policy and political dynamics increased the time pressure on responsible officers who had to take decisions without proper diagnosis of the problem. The championing of M&E was also hampered by the current practice of focusing on activities and outputs rather than on outcomes. Another factor that hindered the championing of M&E is the fact that a majority of the institutions surveyed saw M&E as a form of policing and a way of controlling staff, and as the job of the M&E unit and not of all managers.

Generally, strategic plans contained implementation frameworks with indicators and targets. Further, indicators and targets were integrated into annual performance plans to measure and monitor performance. However, overachievement of those targets was rare as a result of persistent budget cuts from the government that consistently led to the downward revision of annual targets. On the question of “incentives” in circumstances where performance was either above or below expectation, the study did not establish a conclusive practice across the public sector. Even though several “reward and punishment” mechanisms were mentioned as being used by the institutions surveyed, there was no clear approach to administering those mechanisms.

A majority of the institutions surveyed used evaluation evidence, with most of them using it throughout the programme life cycle. Internally-generated evaluation evidence was used more to improve the understanding of interventions and to enhance the value derived from the participation of stakeholders in the planning and implementation of evaluation, than to make changes to policies. The results of the study showed that more institutions used evaluation recommendations from other departments or stakeholders than from internal sources. A striking result was that, irrespective of whether evaluation recommendations were from internal or external sources, most institutions reported using it either often or always to improve their understanding of interventions. Further, the results showed that in either case, fewer institutions would often or always use the evidence for making changes to policies. This finding may point towards a weak link between evaluation evidence and policy change.

A majority of the surveyed institutions had units in their structures that were dedicated to M&E. Most of these units had fewer than seven posts, with over 70% of the institutions indicating a number of vacancies in their M&E units. On another front, over 50% of the institutions surveyed indicated that their performance information management systems either rarely or never integrated most information needed by managers. This practice implies that the output from the system is not what managers require to make decisions, or that the decisions made using such information are not fully supported.

Generally, whenever performance was below expectation, most institutions surveyed would either rarely or never sanction the responsible official. The argument advanced for this practice was that targets are usually set at a departmental level, and attributing non-achievement to an individual may be difficult. On the other hand, fewer than one-third of the institutions surveyed

would either reward or regard highly staff members who were responsible for performance that was above expectation. This is compounded by the fact that in over 40% of the institutions, senior managers took personal credit without acknowledging their team whenever performance was above expectation. In over 30% of the institutions that performed above expectation, learning was either rarely or never documented and shared internally and externally. This practice denies follow-on programmes the opportunity to innovate based on past lessons.

The main methods used to disseminate M&E information were community meetings and websites, while the least commonly used methods were academic journals and conference papers. Dissemination of evidence using academic journals and conference papers is more targeted and interactive, since these are generally subjected to rigorous peer review mechanisms, and benefit from well-structured and scientific feedback processes. Thus, they provide a robust channel for disseminating scientific information which can inform decision-making.

On average, the results indicated a relatively weak supply side. As a result, most institutions did not undertake evaluation as a systematic research process. In addition, most institutions had weak internal capacity to conduct evaluations, so that evaluations were often conducted by external consultants. Furthermore, most institutions focused on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact. This implies the following: that most institutions carried out more of a monitoring and process form of evaluation, as opposed to an outcome and impact form of evaluation; that most institutions had too few financial resources allocated to evaluation; and that more than one-third of the institutions did not see problems as an opportunity for learning and improvement.

Barriers to the use and supply of evaluation evidence were assessed and analysed in two categories, namely value-related and system-related barriers. The results showed that the supply and use of M&E evidence was weighed down more by systemic than value-related barriers. Most institutions cited the following as being critical barriers: too few financial resources being allocated to evaluation; weak capacity for conducting evaluations within the department; a focus on activities and outputs rather than on outcomes and impact; M&E being seen as a form of policing and a way of controlling staff; time pressure making it difficult or impossible to make decisions; and evaluation not being undertaken as a systematic process.

Overall, the current performance of M&E culture was marked by a combination of *doing things together* (collaborative/clan culture), *doing new things* (adhocratic/creating culture), *doing things fast* (competition culture), and *doing things right* (control/hierarchy culture). However, the working hypothesis envisioned a greater focus on *doing new things* (adhocracy) blended with *doing things right*. As such, the working hypothesis was not fully supported. Consequently, to achieve the envisioned culture, the study makes two broad structural and organisational recommendations, namely: creating and enhancing strong support ('championship') as a key

driver for endogenous demand for M&E; and increasing the understanding, acceptance, standardisation and performance of the M&E function in the public sector through the implementation of a deliberate policy framework that promotes incentives for the supply and use of M&E evidence, M&E capacity strengthening, mainstreaming, and institutionalisation.

## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1 Background of the Study**

This report presents the findings of a baseline study on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) culture in the National Integrated M&E System (NIMES) in Kenya as part of a wider programme in Kenya and Ghana, building on the knowledge gained from similar studies previously carried out in Benin, Uganda and South Africa in 2017. The study is an initiative of the Government of Kenya (GOK), in collaboration with the Twende Mbele programme, to strengthen performance M&E in Africa.

Twende Mbele is a peer learning partnership, started by Uganda, South Africa and Benin, who have been working together with the Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) Anglophone Africa and IDEV since 2012 to share experiences related to M&E. The goal of Twende Mbele is to support the widespread implementation and sustainability of M&E systems through partnerships and collaboration across Africa. Through Twende, it is hoped that M&E systems in partner countries will be improved and used more widely. Specifically, Twende initiatives are intended to improve governance throughout Africa in a number of ways: they hope to stimulate the demand for, and the use of, M&E tools within partner countries and by other governments; they aim to improve the understanding of M&E and encourage greater knowledge about its use; and they promote the sharing throughout Africa of information and learning about how M&E has been successfully used. In addition, the Programme supports collaboratively developed M&E practices, policies, tools and procedures, as well as effective and collaborative programme management.

As a step towards directing the type of interventions to be undertaken in the country's NIMES, the State Department of Planning, in collaboration with Twende Mbele, commissioned a baseline survey of the performance M&E culture in the public sector in Kenya. The study aims to establish baseline information on the M&E culture that exists within the public sector by identifying the current conditions against which future changes in the country's NIMES and M&P culture can be tracked. Specifically, the study is meant to assess the state of M&E culture in the government by delineating how various M&E systems interact with each other to improve performance and accountability, with a specific focus on policy, approach, conceptual, framework and organisational arrangements in the public sector. The long-term value of this study would be to increase the adaptation of M&E and performance management as part of public sector reform.

## **1.2 Efforts to Establish a Monitoring and Evaluation System in Kenya**

Development of an integrated M&E system in Kenya began in 2000 with the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2000-2003). This was followed by the development of the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES) in 2004. NIMES was used to track the performance of the Economic Recovery Strategy 2003-2007, and is currently being used to track performance progress for the medium-term plans (MTPs) of Kenya Vision 2030, which is the country's development blueprint. The creation of the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate (MED) in the then Ministry of Planning and National Development gave M&E a home within the government sector.

For devolution and county governments, the national government developed the County Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (CIMES) Guidelines for the county governments to monitor and report on the implementation of County Integrated Development Plans (CIDP). Both Kenya Vision 2030 and the CIDPs have M&E frameworks to act as a guide in tracking their performance.

The Constitution of Kenya 2010, in articles 10, 35, 56, 174, 185, 201, 203, 225, 220, 226 and 227, implies that there is a need for a structured way of monitoring policies, programmes and projects. In addition, the County Governments Act, 2012 (Sections 47 & 108), and the Public Finance Management Act, 2012 (Section 126), require clear county planning and monitoring systems. This means that both levels of governments should provide collaborative and evidence-based sustainable solutions for growth and development. In practice, this should be backed by evidence from quality and timely M&E data regarding the implementation of development projects, programmes and policies.

## **2. Theoretical Framework**


M&E culture is an organisational culture that deliberately seeks information about its performance to learn how to better manage and deliver its programmes and services, and thereby to improve its performance (Mayne, 2008). Organisations that have this culture value empirical evidence about the results they are aiming to achieve. This definition corresponds with the World Bank definition that M&E culture comprises a shared set of values, conventions, or social practices; with a positive M&E culture denoting a situation where M&E is accepted, welcomed, encouraged and valued by all members of the team as an essential part of successfully implementing projects (World Bank, 2009).

These definitions indicate situations where there may be a demand for, and provision of, M&E. As CLEAR (2012) has observed, when decision-makers wish to use evidence from M&E systems to make choices, demand for M&E is generated. An important component of demand

is that it should be endogenous to the system in which it is operating (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 2003). Literature suggests that endogenous demand for M&E systems exists when the following elements are present: there are well-positioned individual and institutional champions across the system; there are incentives that link performance data, monitoring information and evaluation recommendations to resource allocation that is results-orientated; and appropriate evaluations that promote the use of their recommendations are commissioned (Kusek & Rist, 2004; Mackay, 2007; Plaatjies & Porter, 2011).

Inevitably, a demand for M&E calls for the supply of M&E to keep the system in equilibrium. Any disturbance to this equilibrium affects the functioning of the system. If, for instance, the capacity for supplying M&E information is high, but the demand for quality evidence from decision makers is low, supply and demand will be mismatched. According to Porter (2013), even though there is an apparent demand for evaluation in Africa, the main response remains the use of monitoring systems. Porter further argues that, though 'M&E Units' have been set up by governments in Africa that apparently set incentives for evaluations to be carried out, in reality most of them are units that collate monitoring information and conduct some analysis based on that information.

A recent diagnostic study of the supply of, and demand for, evaluators in South Africa found that problems with the quality of demand are often the cause of problems with the quality and quantity of supply (Philips, 2018). This finding corroborates that of the World Bank (2014). Philips (2018) recommends that, in order to reduce the risk of a shortage in supply of M&E evidence, the primary focus should be on improving the quality of government demand. The implication here is that the performance of M&E systems depends largely on the relationship between demand for evidence-based decisions and the supply of evidence to support those decisions. The strength of this relationship is further dependent upon the organisational M&E culture, thus providing a direct link between organisational culture, performance and M&E (Berrio, 2003; Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Wagner & Spencer, 1996). Conceptually, this relationship can be depicted as shown in Figure 1.



**Figure 1:** Conceptual Framework

This conceptual relationship implies that demand for evidence-based decisions and the supply of evidence for decision-making are interrelated. These two sides of M&E are influenced by the organisational M&E culture as well as barriers to the use of M&E evidence. Depending on how these factors interplay, there is either a strongly or weakly performing M&E system in an organisation.

Indicators of organisational culture are more developed in the broader field of organisation theory. Specifically, the *Competing Values Framework* (CVF) developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1981) and refined by Cameron and Quinn (1999) provides a robust model for diagnosing organisational culture. This framework has two underlying dimensions: whether an organisation has a predominantly internal or external focus, and whether it strives for flexibility and individuality or stability and control. The framework is also based on six organisational culture dimensions and four dominant culture types (ie, clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy). This framework is validated by a lot of research (Denison, 1990; Deshpande & Farley, 2004), and is aligned with other dimensions that describe how people behave when organising (Linnenluecke, 2010; Cameron & Quinn, 2006).

### 3. Study Objective

The objective of the study was to establish baseline information on the M&E culture that exists within the public sector by identifying the current conditions against which future changes in the country's NIMES and culture could be tracked. Accordingly, the working hypothesis of this study was that a culture which has a positive attitude towards change, adaptation and learning will develop improved performance M&E systems which are fully operational. To test this hypothesis, the study sought to answer the following four questions:

- i) Is there endogenous demand for M&E in the Kenyan public sector?
- ii) Is there a sufficient supply of M&E evidence to sustain demand in the Kenyan public sector?
- iii) What are the incentives and barriers to the use of M&E evidence in the Kenyan public sector?
- iv) What is the dominant performance M&E culture in the Kenyan public sector?

## **4. Study Methodology**

This study was designed as mixed-method research combining both quantitative and qualitative strategies. To obtain data, face-to-face interviews and on-line surveys using a questionnaire were adopted. The study targeted all public sector organisations: 22 government ministries and 47 county governments, as well as sampling from state departments, state corporations and county government departments. Sampling of respondents was guided by the terms of reference (ToR), which required that the study conduct (i) 25 in-depth interviews with senior government officials drawn from government ministries, and (ii) 120 online surveys with senior government officials drawn from ministries, state departments, or counties that did not participate in the in-depth face to face interviews. Selection of the required sample was done purposively, taking into consideration the level of implementation of NIMES/CIMES.

A pre-designed instrument was provided by TWENDE MBELE in collaboration with the M&E Directorate (MED) of the State Department of Planning. The instrument comprised a questionnaire utilizing a Likert-type scale with 13 sections. The first section focused on basic data about the respondents and their organisation. The last three sections were focused on understanding the respondents' prior knowledge of TWENDE MBELE, their feedback regarding the interview and their comments on the interview. The remaining 8 sections addressed the core of the study, which centred around the following elements: the M&E institutional environment; performance management incentives; the use of evaluation evidence; the evaluation culture; value-related barriers; evaluation system barriers to evaluation use; the information management system; indicators and targets; evaluation report sharing; and methods of sharing evaluation reports. The units of observation were the key informants from each of the sampled units, who in most cases turned out to be the heads of those units or their designees.

Raw data were cleaned up by triangulating responses across the entire questionnaire to rid it of any inconsistent responses. This was also done by making cross-references to the documents provided as evidence during the interview. Cleaned data were then entered into a

database created in CSpro, and exported to SPSS version 20 for analysis. Quantitative data was analysed descriptively using percentages and measures of central tendency, specifically mean and mode. Analysed data was presented in tables and charts, and was disaggregated into three categories representing the units of analysis for this study, namely state departments, state corporations, and county governments. Qualitative data were analysed by scenario and inductive mapping, particularly to determine the prevailing culture within the public sector, where responses were mapped onto the dimensions of the CVF. A simple grounded theory approach (inductive qualitative analysis) involving content analysis, patterning, and thematic analysis was applied to identify common barriers to positive performance M&E within the public sector.

The major limitation of this study was the mobilisation of respondents. While the researchers managed to conduct 36 in-depth interviews, the online survey yielded only 37 responses after persistent follow-up and reminders from the MED. The literature review shows that online surveys normally have low response rates. For example, a study by Nulty (2008)<sup>1</sup> compared the response rates of paper-based and online surveys for nine surveys and found that, on average, the online survey response rate was 33%, which was 23 points lower than the paper-based survey. Nigel Lindemann (August 2019), in his study *The accumulated data into one number*, found that the average survey response rate was 33%. Fluidsurveys.com says that the average response rate for email surveys is 24.8%<sup>2</sup>. In this study, the face-to-face interview response rate was 144% (36/25), while the online survey response rate was 30.8% (37/120). This is generally within established on-line survey study response rates, and therefore the observed online response rate of this study was considered acceptable.

## 5. Study Findings

### 5.1 Introduction

The findings are organised into two main areas: supply-side and demand-side, as established by the study instrument, and which is similar to a comparable study by CLEAR (2013). The supply-side findings are divided into the following elements: M&E units and staff; the M&E institutional environment; the information management system; indicators and targets; evaluation report sharing; and methods of sharing evaluation reports. The demand side focuses on M&E championship in the public sector, and the use of evaluation evidence. Barriers to both the supply of and demand for evaluation evidence are dealt with separately.

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<sup>1</sup> *The adequacy of response rates to online and paper surveys: what can be done?* Vol. 33, No. 3, June 2008, 301–314.

<sup>2</sup> (<http://fluidsurveys.com/university/response-rate-statistics-online-surveys-aiming/>).

Based on these barriers, and the analysis of demand and supply, an organisation's M&E culture is diagnosed.

## **5.2 Response Rate**


This report is based on the findings from in-depth interviews and online surveys conducted with a total of 73 respondents drawn from 30 state departments, 6 state corporations, and 37 county departments. This represents a response rate of 50.3% of the total senior management population, of whom 51 (69.9%) were male and 22 (30.1%) were female. Of the total respondents, 22 (30.1%) had worked in the public sector for over 20 years, 27 (37.0%) for between 10 and 19 years, and 24 (32.9%) had worked for a period of fewer than nine years. A total of 61 respondents (83.56%) had been in their current posts for a period of six years or less, with 32 (52.5%) of them having been in their current position for three years or less.

In terms of education levels, 67 (91.8%) of the respondents had a master's level of education and above, while six (8.2%) had either an undergraduate degree or a professional qualification. With regard to the respondents' current job levels, 46 (63%) were drawn from senior management, with the remaining 27 (37%) coming from mid-level management. Only 14 (19.2%) of the respondents had heard of the Twende Mbele Project.

### 5.3 The Supply Side of M&E

#### 5.3.1 The M&E Institutional Environment

In considering the institutional environment for M&E, attention was paid to the existence of established M&E units within the public sector, and the organisational commitment to M&E, by looking at the position of M&E in the organisational structure, the number of M&E posts in that structure, and how many of those posts had been filled. A total of 68 (93.2%) respondents had a unit dedicated to M&E. Chart 1 shows that, although 93.2% of the institutions had M&E units, the majority (51.5%) of them had fewer than four posts, 30.9% had between four and six posts, while 17.6% had been established with seven or more posts in their structure. Of the five institutions that had no unit dedicated to M&E, four were county departments. On the other hand, four (5.5%) of the surveyed institutions did not have a formal structure for M&E units.




**Chart 1:** Percentage of Institutions with M&E Units, and their Staffing Levels

Chart 2 presents a summary of the vacant posts in M&E structures for the entire number of surveyed institutions. As shown in the chart, 17 (23.3%) of the institutions reported having no vacant posts in their M&E units, while 56 (76.7%) had one or more vacant posts. Of the 30 state departments surveyed, five (16.7%) had all posts filled, nine (30%) had between one and three vacant positions, while 16 (53.3%) had four or more unfilled positions in their M&E units. Of the six autonomous government agencies (SAGAs) that were surveyed, one had no vacant posts in its M&E unit, four (66.7%) had between one and three vacant posts, while one had seven vacant posts. Eleven county government departments, representing 29.7% of the surveyed county departments, had all posts filled in their M&E structures, while 12 (32.4%) of the county departments reported having between one and three vacant posts. Fourteen county departments, representing 37.8% of the county departments surveyed, reported having four or more vacant positions.

Regarding responsibility levels for M&E, 43 (58.9%) of the surveyed institutions reported that their M&E units were headed by officers at director level, while the remaining 30 (41.1%) were


headed by an official below director level. Of the institutions whose M&E units were headed by a director-level officer, 20 (46.5%) were state departments, four (9.3%) were SAGAs, and 19 (44.2%) were county departments. Of the 30 organisations whose M&E units were headed by an officer below the level of director, 10 (33.3%) were state departments, two (6.67%) were SAGAs, and 18 (60%) were county departments.



**Chart 2:** Number of Institutions with M&E Vacant Posts

### 5.3.2 Information Management System

The assessment of the information management system (IMS) capacity of public-sector institutions was based on three dimensions, namely: whether the system integrated all the information needed by managers; whether the system considered and integrated the information needs of different stakeholders; and, whether the system took into account the quality of consultation processes that were needed to ensure that the information needs of different users were taken into consideration. The study established that the information management system integrated most information needed by managers in 32 (43.8%) of the institutions, while in another 32 (43.8%), there was limited integration. Nine (12.4%) of the institutions surveyed reported that their information management systems did not integrate the information needed by managers at all. Chart 3 provides a summary of this data.



**Chart 3:** Integration of Managers' Information Needs

On the question of whether the IMS considered and integrated all the information needs of the different stakeholders; six (8.2%) of the surveyed institutions reported that this did not happen at all; 29 (39.7%) reported that this practice happened, but on a limited basis; another 29 (39.7%) of the surveyed institutions confirmed that this practice was mostly in place, while 9 (12.3%) of the institutions reported that this practice was well in place. Table 1 summarises these data.

**Table 1:** Integration of Information Needs of Stakeholders

Does IMS integrate information needs of different stakeholders?									
Response	State Departments		SAGAs		County Department		Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
Not at all	3	10.0	0	0.0	3	8.1	6	8.2	
Limited	7	23.3	3	50.0	19	51.4	29	39.7	
Mostly in place	16	53.3	2	33.3	11	29.7	29	39.7	
Well in place	4	13.3	1	16.7	4	10.8	9	12.3	
Don't Know	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	
Total	30	100.0	6	100.0	37	100.0	73	100.0	

As to whether the system took into account the quality of the consultation processes needed to ensure that the information needs of different users were taken into consideration, five (6.8%) of the surveyed institutions reported that this was not done at all, while 25 (34.2%) reported that this was done to a limited extent. However, this practice was mostly in place in 35 (47.9%) of the institutions surveyed, and well in place in seven (9.6%) of them. Table 2 summarises these data.

**Table 2:** System Consideration of Quality of Consultation Processes

Does IMS consider quality of consultation processes needed to ensure that information needs of different users are taken into consideration?								
Response	State Departments		SAGAs		County Department		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Not at all	2	6.7	0	0.0	3	8.1	5	6.8
Limited	10	33.3	1	16.7	14	37.8	25	34.2
Mostly in place	15	50.0	4	66.7	16	43.2	35	47.9
Well in place	3	10.0	1	16.7	3	8.1	7	9.6
Don't Know	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.7	1	1.4
Total	30	100.0	6	100.0	37	100.0	73	100.0

### 5.3.3 The Practice When Departmental Performance is Below Expectation

The survey established that 66 (90.4%) of the institutions surveyed had their performance expectations and individual performance agreements linked. However, this was not the practice in three of the state departments and four of the county departments surveyed. In circumstances where either individual or departmental performance was below expectation, five (6.8%) of the institutions surveyed indicated that their reports were structured to hide information, while 38 (52.1%) of the institutions indicated that reports were rarely structured to conceal poor performance (with 34.2% also reporting, 'never'). Interestingly, in five (6.8%) of the institutions surveyed, respondents did not know whether reports were structured to hide information on performance that was below expectation. Their argument was that M&E reports were escalated upwards within the institutional hierarchy and they could not tell whether senior officials further up the ladder actually reported in accordance with this information. These data are summarised in Table 3.


**Table 3:** Structuring Reports in Situations of Underperformance

Response	State Departments		SAGAs		County Department		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<b>Reports structured to hide the information</b>								
Never	12	40.0	4	66.7	9	24.3	25	34.2
Rarely	15	50.0	2	33.3	21	56.8	38	52.1
Often	1	3.3	0	0.0	4	10.8	5	6.8
Always	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Don't Know	2	6.7	0	0.0	3	8.1	5	6.8
Total	30	100.0	6	100.0	37	100.0	73	100.0

In 27 (37%) of the institutions surveyed, results would never be ignored when departmental performance was below expectation. However, in 35 (47.9%) of the institutions surveyed, such practices happened, though rarely. Eight (11%) of the institutions surveyed reported that this practice often happened, while two institutions reported that this practice always happened. Table 4 summarises these data. Other practices identified when performance was below expectation are summarised in Chart 4. Generally, whenever performance was below expectation, most institutions surveyed would either rarely or never sanction the responsible officials, and managers would also rarely or never reject the accuracy of poor results. In most cases, learning and changes would be documented and used to improve future results. Furthermore, in most institutions, the responsible officials would be required to explain and identify how results could be improved.

**Table 4:** Responses to Whether Below-Expectation Performance was Ignored

Response	State Departments		SAGAs		County Department		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
<b>Results ignored</b>								
Never	15	50.0	4	66.7	8	21.6	27	37.0
Rarely	12	40.0	2	33.3	21	56.8	35	47.9
Often	2	6.7	0	0.0	6	16.2	8	11.0
Always	1	3.3	0	0.0	1	2.7	2	2.7
Don't Know	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.7	1	1.4
Total	30	100.0	6	100.0	37	100.0	73	100.0



**Chart 4:** Other practices when performance is below expectation

#### 5.3.4 The Practice When Departmental Performance is Above Expectation


In cases when the departmental performance was above expectation, the study established that learning was either rarely or never documented and shared internally and externally in 25 (34.2%) of the surveyed institutions (of which 16 were county departments while nine were state departments). However, in 48 (65.8%) institutions, learning was either often or always documented and then shared internally and externally. This practice was reported in 21 (70%) state departments, all SAGAs, and 21 (56.8%) county departments. The study also established that in 31 (42.5%) institutions, senior managers took personal credit without acknowledging their team whenever performance was above expectation. This practice was reported in 11 (36.7%) state departments, two (33.3%) SAGAs, and 18 (48.6%) county departments.

Only 24 (32.9%) of the institutions surveyed would reward the official responsible for performance that was above expectation. This practice was reported in 8 (26.7%) state departments, 4 (66.7%) SAGAs, and 12 (32.4%) county departments. On the other hand, 48 (65.7%) institutions comprising 22 (73.3%) state departments, 24 (64.9%) county departments, and 2 (33.3%) SAGAs, either rarely or never rewarded officers responsible for performance that was above expectation.

The study showed that in 50 (68.5%) of the surveyed institutions, lessons learnt with respect to performance that was above expectation would be documented. This practice was either often or always the case in 19 (63.3%) state departments, all SAGAs and 25 (67.6%) county departments. However, in 22 (30.1%) of the surveyed institutions, lessons learnt were either never or rarely documented, with 10 (33.3%) state departments, one (16.7%) SAGA, and 11 (29.7%) county departments reporting this to be the case.

In 42 (57.6%) of the surveyed institutions, officers responsible for performance that was above expectation would either rarely or never be highly regarded in the department. Twenty-two (73.3%) state departments and 18 (48.6%) county departments reported this practice. However, in 29 (39.7%) of the surveyed institutions representing eight (26.7%) state departments, four (66.7%) SAGAs and 17 (45.9%) county departments, officers responsible for performance that was above expectation would either often or always be highly regarded in the department.

In 26 (35.6%) surveyed institutions representing eight (26.7%) state departments, two (33.3%) SAGAs and 16 (43.2%) county departments, performance results that were above expectation would either rarely or never be discussed by the M&E unit to identify the causes. On the other hand, those results would often or always be discussed in 46 (63.1%) of the surveyed institutions, representing 22 (73.3%) state departments, four (66.7%) SAGAs, and 20 (54%) county departments. Chart 5 summarises these data.




**Chart 5:** Practices when Performance is Above Expectation

### 5.3.5 Dissemination of Evaluation Reports

Dissemination is critical for the widespread supply of evaluation evidence. As shown in Chart 6, the most commonly reported method of sharing reports was “community meetings”, with 61 (83.6%) of the institutions surveyed indicating their use. The proportion of institutions using this method appeared to be the same across state departments (83%), SAGAs (83%) and county departments (83%). The second-most commonly used method was “websites”, which 56 (76.7%) of the institutions indicated they used. Twenty-two (73.3%) state departments, five (83.3%) SAGAs and 29 (78.4%) county departments reported that they used this method to disseminate M&E reports. The least commonly used methods were “academic journals” (15.1%) and “conference papers” (34.2%). The results of the study showed that only eight

(26.7%) state departments and 3 (50%) SAGAs reported using academic journals, while no county departments used them. Fourteen (46.7%) state departments, all SAGAs and five (13.5%) county departments reported that they used conference papers to disseminate their M&E reports. Chart six summarises the results of how evaluation reports are shared.



**Chart 6: Methods of Sharing Evaluation Reports**

## 5.4 The Demand Side of M&E

### 5.4.1 Introduction

This section presents the findings of the study on M&E demand along three dimensions that are derived from the survey tool, namely: M&E championship within the public sector; performance management incentives; and use of M&E evidence.

### 5.4.2 M&E Championship in the Public Sector

M&E championship determines the ability of M&E units to affect demand for (and therefore, supply of) evidence for decision-making, and whether that evidence is used to inform decision-making. At the national level, an M&E unit is established as a directorate within the National Treasury in the State Department of Planning. Within the government line ministries, state

corporations and county governments, M&E units are located in departments of planning and mostly headed by economists who are employed at various levels of management. Some work at director level, while others are positioned below director level. Generally, the higher in the organisational hierarchy, the champion is, the greater their influence on resource allocation for evaluations and implementation of evidence-based decisions.

From the findings of this study, 43 (58.9%) of the surveyed institutions reported that their M&E units were headed by officers at director level, while the remaining 30 (41.1%) were headed by an official below director level. Of the institutions whose M&E units were headed by a director-level officer, 20 (46.5%) were state departments, four (9.3%) were SAGAs and 19 (44.2%) were county departments. Of the 30 organisations whose M&E units were headed by an officer below the level of director, 10 (33.3%) were state departments, two (6.67%) were SAGAs, while 18 (60%) were county departments.

#### 5.4.3 Performance Management Incentives

All surveyed institutions had strategic plans (even though some had expired and others were in draft form). Generally, strategic plans contained implementation frameworks with indicators and annual targets. In 27 (90%) state departments, six (100%) SAGAs, and 35 (94.6%) county departments, indicators and targets were integrated into annual performance plans to measure and monitor performance. In all the institutions, both departmental and individual work plans were present, and were drawn from, and linked to, the strategic plan.

On the question of performance management incentives, this study looked at aspects of “reward and punishment” for achieving results above and below expectation. Most of the institutions surveyed reported that over-achievement with regard to targets was rare as a result of persistent budget cuts from the government that constantly led to the downward revision of annual targets. Some of the “punishment” mechanisms cited as being used by the institutions surveyed included warning letters, putting staff on performance improvement plans, and where performance still did not improve, separation. “Reward” mechanisms that were cited included letters of commendation, promotions, some form of bonus payment for excellent performance, annual parties for staff, and departmental recognition events.

The study showed that in circumstances where performance was below expectation, most institutions (60.3%) would either never or rarely sanction the officers responsible. This practice was reported in 18 (60%) state departments, four (66.7%) SAGAs, and 22 (59.5%) county departments. However, in 80.8% of the surveyed institutions, officers responsible for underperformance would be given an opportunity to explain and identify how results could be improved. This practice was reported in 28 (93.3%) state departments, all SAGAs, and 25 (67.6%) county departments.

In cases where performance was above expectation, 31 (42.5%) of the institutions surveyed, representing 11 (36.7%) state departments, two (33.3%) SAGAs, and 18 (48.6%) county departments, reported that senior managers either often or always took personal credit without acknowledging their team. This could probably explain why 65.7% of the institutions surveyed reported that officers responsible for performance above expectation were either never or were rarely likely to be rewarded. This was the practice in 22 (73.3%) state departments, two (33.3%) SAGAs, and 24 (64.9%) county departments. Further, 57.6% of the institutions surveyed, representing 22 (73.3%) state departments, two (33.3%) SAGAs, and 18 (48.6%) county departments, reported that such officers would be either never or rarely highly regarded in the department. Interestingly, in both cases of under- or over-performance, a majority (65.8%) of the institutions documented and shared lessons internally and externally through their annual reports and in their strategic plans. Chart 7 summarises these practices.



**Chart 7:** Performance Management Incentives

The public sector in Kenya has institutionalised performance contracting, where each institution negotiates its annual targets with the government’s performance contracting agency and cascades the negotiated targets to its individual departments. Negotiated targets are informed by the institutions’ strategic plans, but it is not uncommon for such targets to be varied based on ad hoc presidential directives or changing government policy. Thus, the achievement of institutional objectives and agreed targets is largely moderated by the performance contracting environment and government policy.

#### 5.4.4 Use of Evaluation Evidence

Evidence has been described in the literature as “what constitutes actual or asserted facts planned for use in support of a conclusion” (Kothari, Boyko, & Campbell-Davison, 2015). In Section 2.0, it has been argued that, when decision-makers use evidence from M&E systems in making decisions, a demand for M&E is generated. The demand for M&E then calls for the


supply of M&E. The focus in evidence-policy-making is to determine the extent to which policies are informed by evidence, which in turn is influenced by (i) a demand for evidence by policy-makers; (ii) a good supply of quality evidence; (iii) contextually-relevant research being available to policy-makers; and (iii), connections being established between researchers and policy-makers.

The baseline survey sought to establish from respondents whether, and when, evaluation evidence is used. A total of 63 (86.3%) institutions reported using evaluation evidence: 29 (96.7%) state departments, six (100%) SAGAs, and 28 (75.7%) county departments. Of the 10 (13.7%) institutions which reported that they did not use evaluation evidence, one (3.3%) was a state department, while nine (24.3%) were county departments. Of the institutions that used evaluation evidence, 44 (69.8%) used it throughout the entire programme or project life cycle, i.e., throughout the planning, designing and implementation phases. However, 19 (30.2%) of the institutions using M&E evidence indicated that they used it only once an evaluation had been completed. Table 5 summarises these data.

**Table 5:** When Evaluation Evidence is Used

Those using	State Departments		SAGAs		County Department		Total	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Throughout planning designing and implementation of programmes and projects	21	72.4	6	100.0	17	60.7	44	69.8
Once evaluation is completed	8	27.6	0	0.0	11	39.3	19	30.2
Total	29	100.0	6	100.0	28	100.0	63	100.0

As Chart 8 shows, evaluation evidence was mostly used to improve the understanding of interventions, and to enhance the value derived from the participation of stakeholders in the planning and implementation of evaluations. A relatively large percentage (30.2%) of the institutions that used evaluation evidence indicated that they either never or rarely used it to make changes to policies.



**Chart 8:** Actual use of Evaluation Evidence

Interestingly, when a comparison was made between the frequency of use of internal evaluation evidence and the use of external evidence from other departments or stakeholders, the results of the study showed that more institutions used evaluation recommendations from other departments or stakeholders than from internal sources. In other words, the rarity of evidence use across all the four stipulated uses decreased with the use of external evaluation evidence. What was striking was that irrespective of whether evaluation recommendations were from internal or external sources, most institutions reported using it either often or always to improve their understanding of interventions. Further, the data showed that in either case, fewer institutions would often or always use the data for making changes to policies. Table 6 summarises these data.

**Table 6:** Use of Internal and External Evaluation Recommendations

Use of Evaluation Evidence	Percentage of Institutions That Use			
	Internal Evaluation Recommendations:		External Evaluation Recommendations	
	Never or Rarely	Often or Always	Never or Rarely	Often or Always
Make changes in the policies	30.20%	71.40%	23.80%	76.20%
Improve understanding of intervention	17.50%	82.50%	15.90%	84.10%
Give legitimacy to a course of action taken	27%	73%	17.50%	82.50%
Enhance value derived from stakeholders' participation	20.60%	79.40%	19.00%	81.00%

## **5.5 Barriers to the Use and Supply of Evaluation Evidence**

### 5.5.1 Introduction

The conceptual model presented in Figure 1 identified barriers to the use of evaluation evidence as one of the variables that affect the performance of M&E systems. This section describes the major barriers to the effective use of evaluation evidence in decision-making, learning and accountability. These barriers are discussed under two categories, namely value-related and system-related barriers.

### 5.5.2 Value-Related Barriers

The study assessed value-related barriers to evaluation using a 10-item Likert-type scale that sought to establish how frequently public-sector institutions experienced specific barriers. The results showed that in the majority (54.8%) of institutions surveyed, M&E was seen as policing and a way of controlling staff. This barrier was more likely to be experienced in county and state departments than in SAGAs. In 49.3% of the surveyed institutions, M&E was regarded as the job of the M&E unit and not of all managers. Again, this barrier was more likely to be experienced in county and state departments than in SAGAs. The third most experienced value-related barrier was a fear of admitting mistakes or problems, which affected the reporting of any performance that was below expectation, and discouraged innovative ways of solving problems. More of the county and state departments experienced this barrier than SAGAs. Table 7 summarises these data.

**Table 7: Value-Related Barriers to the Use of Evaluation Evidence**

Major barriers to the effective use of evaluation in decision-making, learning and accountability	Number of Institutions Experiencing a Barrier Often or Always							
	State Departments		SAGAs		County Departments		Total	
Problems are concealed	8	26.7%	1	16.7%	10	27.0%	19	26.0%
Resistance from senior management to transparent decision-making processes	6	20.0%	1	16.7%	8	21.6%	15	20.5%
Little respect for evidence-based decision-making in the department	6	20.0%	1	16.7%	13	35.1%	20	27.4%
The hierarchy makes it difficult to openly and robustly discuss performance	12	40.0%	3	50.0%	9	24.3%	24	32.9%
Fear of admitting mistakes or problems	14	46.7%	2	33.3%	16	43.2%	32	43.8%
The M&E unit has little influence in the department	10	33.3%	0	0.0%	18	48.6%	28	38.4%
M&E is seen as policing and a way of controlling staff	16	53.3%	3	50.0%	21	56.8%	40	54.8%
M&E is regarded as the job of the M&E unit and not of all managers	12	40.0%	1	16.7%	23	62.2%	36	49.3%
Senior management do not champion M&E and there is no honesty about performance	7	23.3%	1	16.7%	9	24.3%	17	23.3%
Problems not treated as an opportunity for learning and improvement	7	23.3%	1	16.7%	15	40.5%	23	31.5%

### 5.5.3 System-Related Barriers

Systemic barriers to the use and supply of evaluation evidence were assessed using a 9-item Likert-type scale that was designed to establish how often specific system-related barriers were experienced within the public sector. The findings of this study showed that most (79.5%) of the institutions surveyed either often or always experienced a barrier occasioned by too few financial resources allocated to evaluation. This barrier was experienced by 26 (86.7%) state departments, five (83.3%) SAGAs, and 27 (73%) county departments. The second most cited barrier was weak departmental capacity for conducting evaluations, implying that evaluations were conducted by external consultants. At least 66.7%, 83.3% and 48.6%, of state departments, SAGAs, and county departments, respectively, experienced this barrier. In 42 (57.5%) of the institutions surveyed, evaluation was more of a process, focusing on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact. This barrier was reported by 53.3%, 66.7%, and 49.6%, of state departments, SAGAs and county departments, respectively. Table 8 presents data on the systemic barriers.

**Table 8:** Systemic Barriers to the Use and Supply of Evaluation Evidence

Description of Barrier	Number of Institutions Reporting a Barrier Often or Always			
	State Departments	SAGAs	County Departments	Total
Evaluation is not undertaken as a systematic research process	14 (46.7%)	4 (66.7%)	19 (51.4%)	37 (50.7%)
Time pressure means decisions are often taken without proper diagnosis of the problem	16 (53.3%)	3 (50.0%)	20 (54.1%)	39 (53.4%)
Capacity to conduct evaluation within the department is weak and evaluations are conducted by external consultants	20 (66.7%)	5 (83.3%)	18 (48.6%)	43 (58.9%)
There are inadequate mechanisms for implementing evaluation recommendations (for example, management improvement plan)	17 (56.7%)	2 (33.3%)	19 (51.4%)	38 (52.1%)
Managers do not have the skills to understand and use evaluation recommendations	9 (30.0%)	3 (50.0%)	8 (21.6%)	20 (27.4%)
Focus will stay on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact	16 (53.3%)	4 (66.7%)	22 (49.6%)	42 (57.5%)
Concerns about 'unhelpful' conclusions about policies' effectiveness	9 (30.0%)	1 (16.7%)	11 (29.7)	21 (27.450)
There is no consistent demand for evaluation from ministers and management	10 (33.3%)	0 (0.0%)	18 (48.6%)	28 (38.4%)
Too few financial resources allocated to evaluation	26 (86.7%)	5 (83.3%)	27 (73.0%)	58 (79.5%)


#### 5.5.4 Synthesis of Performance M&E Culture

Performance M&E culture was assessed along the four dimensions of the Competing Values Framework. Specific items in the questionnaire were mapped onto the sub-dimensions of the CVF, as detailed in the Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) (Cameron & Quinn, 1999). Scores for each sub-dimension were determined based on the average scores assigned by the respondents. Using these scores, the OCAI was filled in online. This process was repeated, based on the **desired ('preferred') scores premised on the study's theory of change**. The results are presented in Table 9 and Chart 9 below. Taking the region shaded in pink to represent the current situation, and the region shaded blue to represent the preferred culture, the chart shows that, currently, the performance M&E culture in Kenya has a blend of *doing things together* (collaborative or clan culture), *doing new things* (adhocratic or creating culture), *doing things fast* (competition culture), and *doing things right* (control or hierarchy culture). However, the envisaged theory of change envisions a greater focus on *doing new things* (adhocracy) blended with *doing things right*. Thus, the existing practice needs to be adjusted to fully support *a culture which looks positively towards change, adaptation and learning*. In other words, M&E practice requires that there should be a de-emphasising of some

aspects of *clan* and *market* culture that currently stand in the way of enhanced adhocracy blended with hierarchy.

**Table 9: OCAI Scores**

Culture Profile	Scores	
	NOW	PREFERRED
CLAN	24.83	21.67
ADHOCRACY	30.17	34.17
MARKET	23.67	21.67
HIERARCHY	21.33	22.50



**Chart 9: Current and Preferred Culture**

## 6. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 6.1 Conclusions

#### Is there endogenous demand for M&E in the Kenyan public sector?

The study showed that endogenous demand for M&E within the public sector is driven by several articles in the Constitution of Kenya 2010 which that a structured way of monitoring policies, programmes and projects is needed. Furthermore, the County Governments Act, 2012, and the Public Finance Management Act, 2012, require clear county planning and monitoring systems. Within the public sector, the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate works to strengthen evidence-based policy formulation and to improve on the tracking of results. To achieve this, the directorate works with various CPPMUs at both levels of government. Almost all institutions surveyed had a unit dedicated to M&E. Most of these units were headed by officers at senior management level within the government. This is an important condition for ensuring endogenous demand, since it guarantees championship high up in the organisational structure. However, in the public sector, accountability for performance and resource allocation decisions is vested in the offices of either the principal or cabinet secretaries, a good proportion of whom were reported to not provide a consistent demand for evaluation. As a result, too few resources were allocated to evaluation.

Furthermore, erratic changes in government policy, and political dynamics, increased the time pressures on responsible officers, who had to take decisions without a proper diagnosis of the problems being dealt with. M&E championship was also weighed down by the current practice, which focuses on activities and outputs rather than on outcomes. Another factor that weighed down on the championing of M&E is the fact that the majority of institutions surveyed saw M&E as a form of policing and a way of controlling staff, and as the job of the M&E unit and not of all managers.

Generally, strategic plans contained implementation frameworks with indicators and targets. Furthermore, indicators and targets were integrated into annual performance plans to measure and monitor performance. However, overachievement of those targets was rare as a result of persistent budget cuts by the government, which consistently led to the downward revision of annual targets. On the question of “incentives” in circumstances where performance was either above or below expectation, the study did not establish a conclusive practice across the public sector. Even though a number of “reward and punishment” mechanisms were cited as being used by the institutions surveyed, there was no clear approach to administering those mechanisms.

The majority of the institutions surveyed used evaluation evidence, with most of them using it throughout the programme life cycle. Internally-generated evaluation evidence was used more to improve the understanding of interventions and to enhance the value derived from stakeholders’ participation in the planning and implementation of evaluation, than to make changes to policies. The results of the study showed that more institutions used evaluation

recommendations from other departments or stakeholders than from internal sources. In other words, the number of institutions reporting the use of external evaluation evidence was consistently higher than those reporting the use of internal evidence for the same purposes. A striking result was that irrespective of whether evaluation recommendations were from internal or external sources, most institutions reported using it either often or always to improve their understanding of interventions. Furthermore, the results showed that in either case, fewer institutions would often or always use the data for making changes to policies. This finding may point towards a weak link between evaluation evidence and policy change.

### **Is there a sufficient supply of M&E evidence to sustain demand?**

The results of this study showed that a majority of the surveyed institutions had units in their structures dedicated to M&E. Most of these units had less than seven posts, with over 70% of the institutions indicating a number of vacancies in their M&E units. Even though the study did not delve into the reasons for vacant posts, inadequate financial allocations to M&E units or a shortage of suitable personnel to fill these posts could be probable explanations. On another front, over 50% of the institutions surveyed indicated that their performance information management systems either rarely or never integrated most of the information needed by managers. Interestingly, the results of this study showed that more institutions had their information management systems consider and integrate all the information needs of different stakeholders. This practice implies that the output from the system is not what managers require to make decisions, or that the decisions made using such information are not fully supported.

Although the practice of structuring reports to hide or ignore information when performance is below expectation was largely reported as being rare, the fact that it could happen means that the affected evaluation reports did not contain accurate information, and therefore decisions made based on those reports were bound not to be useful. Generally, whenever performance was below expectation, most institutions surveyed would either rarely or never sanction the responsible official. The argument advanced for this practice was that targets are usually departmental, and attributing non-achievement to an individual may be difficult. On the other hand, fewer than one-third of the institutions surveyed would either reward or regard highly those staff members who were responsible for performance that was above expectation. This is compounded by the fact that in over 40% of the institutions, senior managers took personal credit, without acknowledging their team, whenever performance was above expectation. In over 30% of the institutions that performed above expectation, learning was either rarely or never documented and shared internally and externally. This practice denies follow-on programmes the opportunity to innovate based on past lessons.

The main methods used to disseminate M&E information were community meetings and websites, while the least commonly used methods were academic journals and conference

papers. The dissemination of evidence using academic journals and conference papers is more targeted and interactive, since these mediums are generally subjected to rigorous peer review mechanisms and benefit from a well-structured and scientific feedback process. Thus, they provide a robust channel for disseminating scientific information that is intended to inform decision-making.

On average, the results indicated a relatively weak supply-side, with the following consequences: most institutions did not undertake evaluation as a systematic research process; most institutions had weak internal capacity to conduct evaluation, so that evaluations were conducted by external consultants; and, most institutions focused on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact. This implies that most institutions carried out more of a monitoring and process evaluation as opposed to an outcome and impact evaluation. It also implies that most institutions had too few financial resources allocated to evaluation, and that more than one-third of the institutions did not see problems as an opportunity for learning and improvement.

### What are the barriers to the use and supply of evaluation evidence in the public sector?

Barriers to the use of evaluation evidence were assessed and analysed in two categories, namely value-related and system-related barriers. The six most cited barriers, in descending order of frequency of citation, were:

Barrier Description	%
Too few financial resources allocated to evaluation	79.5%
Capacity to conduct evaluation within the department is weak, and evaluations are conducted by external consultants	58.9%
Focus will stay on activities and outputs rather than outcomes and impact	57.5%
M&E is seen as policing and a way of controlling staff	54.8%
Time pressure means decisions are often taken without proper diagnosis of the problem	53.4%
Evaluation is not undertaken as a systematic research process	50.7%

In terms of frequency weighting, the results indicated that the supply and use of evaluation evidence was more weighed down by systemic barriers than by value-related barriers.

### What is the dominant performance M&E culture in the Kenyan public sector?

The results showed that the current performance M&E culture had a blend of *doing things together* (collaborative or clan culture), *doing new things* (adhocratic or creating culture), *doing things fast* (competition culture), and *doing things right* (control or hierarchy culture). However, the working hypothesis envisioned a greater focus on *doing new things* (adhocracy) blended with *doing things right*. As such, the working hypothesis was not fully supported. Going forward,

the M&E system in the public sector would need to greatly de-emphasise the clan or collaborative culture, greatly emphasise the adhocracy or creating culture, slightly de-emphasise the market or competing culture, and slightly emphasise the stability or control culture.

## **6.2 Recommendations**

- i. Create and enhance strong championship as a key driver for endogenous demand for M&E through:
  - Domiciling the M&E function in the presidency to influence enhanced resource allocation and the use of evidence for changing policies. This is in line with practices in Benin, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda (CLEAR, 2012). At the state department, state corporation and county levels, domicile the M&E function in the offices of cabinet secretaries, managing directors, and governors, respectively.
  - Transforming MED into an independent authority that coordinates the appraisal, planning, and execution of monitoring and evaluation across the public sector. In this way, ad hoc budget cuts, political influence in resource allocation, and the discretionary use of evaluation evidence could be minimised.
- ii. Increase the understanding, acceptance, standardisation and performance of the M&E function in the public sector through the deliberate application of a policy framework that promotes incentives for the use of M&E evidence, as well as M&E capacity strengthening, mainstreaming, and institutionalisation. This will help to address the systemic and value-related barriers that currently adversely affect the use of, supply of, and demand for, M&E evidence.

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